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Abstract—  This  paper  aims  at  considering  policy 
regimes while studying international price transmission 
mechanisms.  The  focus  is  on  the  soft  wheat  market 
between the United States and the European Union in 
the  years  1978-2003.  EU  domestic  and  border  policies 
are  expected  to  play  a  strong  role;  a  theoretical 
framework is developed in which the basic idea is that 
the intervention price acts as a threshold above which 
the  EU  and  the  US  price  can  interact.  A  composite 
variable,  equal  to  the  maximum  between  the 
intervention and the US price, is then introduced in a 
cointegration model and its relation with the EU price is 
studied. In addition to this, other models are estimated, 
in which the adjustment coefficients and the parameters 
of the cointegrating vector are allowed to vary according 
to the policy regime in place. All models yield consistent 
results. The EU price reaction to the long run relations 
suggests that the role of the US price can be understood 
only if policy regimes are adequately accounted for. To 
which  extent  the  US  price  adjusts  to  disequilibria 
requires further research. 
  
Keywords—  International  price  transmission; 
Cointegration; Common Agricultural Policy. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In  literature,  price  transmission  mechanisms  for 
agricultural  commodities  have  received  considerable 
attention. The use of price data only has often implied 
increasingly  sophisticated  techniques,  but  scarce 
attention for policy factors. In econometric models, in 
turn, the latter are explicitly added as regressors in the 
relevant  equations,  but  often  relying  on  simplistic 
hypothesis, like the exogeneity of the world price for 
the European Union (EU) in AGMEMOD [1].  
This works aims at providing alternative schemes 
for the analysis of price transmission in international 
markets that account for policy regime changes. This 
paper  focuses  on  soft  wheat,  a  heavily  traded 
commodity.  The  main  exporters  are  Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, the United States (US) and the EU, 
that together in most years account for about 90% of 
world  wheat  exports  [2].  Policy  regimes  play  a 
significant  role  in  soft  wheat  production  and  export 
shares [3]. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is 
a case in point: during the 1980s the EU emerged as 
the second larger exporter, having previously been a 
net importer. 
Thanks  to  the  EU  Common  Market  Organization 
(CMO) for soft wheat, from the late 1960s already, 
intervention mechanisms ensured that domestic prices 
never fell below the intervention price. Variable levies 
and  export  subsidies  insulated  the  domestic  market. 
The  full  functioning  of  the  CMOs  led  to  surpluses 
growth  and  budgetary  costs  escalation.  In  1992,  the 
MacSharry  Reform  implemented  substantial  cuts  in 
intervention  prices  to  re-align  internal  with  world 
prices;  farmers  were  compensated  through  direct 
subsidies  per  hectare;  but  the  old  variable  levy  and 
export  subsidy  structure  kept  on  insulating  EU 
markets. In 1999, the Agenda 2000 reform set a 15% 
reduction  in  two  years  of  the  intervention  price  for 
cereals, and the introduction of decoupled payments. 
These were  strengthened by the Fischler Reform of 
2003. 
In agricultural trade politics, the most relevant event 
is the institution of the World Trade Organization in 
1995,  and  the  following  implementation  of  the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. The limits 
on domestic support and export subsidies were never 
binding for EU wheat [4]. For market access it was 
agreed  to  convert  all  border  measures  into  import 
duties,  to  be  lowered  in  the  following  six  years.  
However,  the  “intervention  price  plus  55%”
i  rule 
eliminated  any  real  difference  with  the  old  variable 
levy system. 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  agricultural  domestic  and 
border policies cannot be disregarded while studying 
international  price  transmission  for  soft  wheat.  We 
here aim at explicitly considering their role.    2 
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The study of price transmission mechanisms implies 
referring to some basic economic concepts [5]. In a 
nutshell,    the  Law  of  One  Price  (LOP)  states  that 
markets linked by trade and perfect arbitrage will have 
a unique price, when expressed in the same currency, 
net  of  transport  costs.  This  concept  is  one  of  the 
building  blocks  of  international  trade  theory  but, 
nevertheless, most of the empirical tests are against it 
[5] [6]. Border and domestic policies are amongst the 
factors that prevent prices from convergence [7]; trade 
liberalization will improve price transmission.  
Different  econometric  techniques  have  been  used 
within  this  theoretical  framework.  Cointegration 
models  assume  that  non-stationary  variables  will 
nonetheless be linked by a long-run relationship - in 
this  case,  the  LOP  itself.  The  following  Vectorial 
Error  Correction Model  (VECM)  holds  between  the 
prices: 
t i t i 1 t
'





                                         (1) 
where pt is a (n x 1) vector containing the n prices, α is 
the (n x r) matrix of the adjustments parameters, β is 
the cointegration matrix (n x r; r is the cointegration 
rank), Γ is the (n x n) matrix accounting for short-run 
relations, and εt is the (n x 1) vector of white noise 
errors.  If  we  have  n  =  2  prices  in  logarithms, 
normalizing and rearranging terms, β2/β1 is the long-
run  price transmission  elasticity,  as  in equations  (2) 
and (3).  
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Despite  the  use  of  cointegration  techniques  has a 
number of shortcomings [6] [8] [9], they have been 
extensively used. Empirical evidence is mixed. Barassi 
and  Ghoshray  [10]  test  cointegration  with  structural 
change  for  US  Soft  Red  Wheat,  Hard  Red  Winter 
Wheat  and  EU  wheat  export  prices.  After  the 
MacSharry Reform, which is the breakpoint, the EU 
price  is  cointegrated  with  the  US  Soft  Red  Wheat. 
Verga  and  Zuppiroli  [11]  find  that  EU  soft  wheat 
markets are strongly cointegrated amongst themselves 
but not with the US one. Thompson and Bohl [12] find 
that German soft wheat and US Dark Northern Spring 
prices  are  cointegrated.  Thompson  et  al.  [13]  find 
evidence of integration amongst EU and US markets 
which increased after market liberalization reforms. 
In this paper, we aim at testing the presence of co-
movement of domestic EU prices with the world ones; 
policy regimes will need to be taken into account
ii. On 
the import side, the EU price will be positively related 
to  the  world  one  only  when  the  latter  is  above  the 
entry price so that the variable levy goes to zero
iii. On 
the export side, the EU price is positively related to the 
world one only when the latter is at least above the 
intervention  price;  otherwise,  export  refunds  would 
provide a lower threshold for the EU price not to fall. 
The EU and the world price should then be positively 
related  only  when  the  latter  is  above  both  the 
intervention and the entry price. But this, actually, was 
almost never the case.  
Alternatively, we could aim at verifying if there is 
co-movement between the EU and the world price also 
when the latter is below the entry price but above the 
intervention  price.  The  intervention  price  acts  as  a 
lower  “threshold”,  which  allows  to  identify  two 
different  observable  regimes.  If  the  world  price  is 
below the intervention one, then the EU internal price  
is expected to follow the intervention one; if the world 
price is above the intervention price, the EU domestic 
price is expected to follow the behaviour of the world 
one.  
III. EMPIRICAL EXERCISE 
Wheat monthly prices for the US and France for the 
period  1978:12  to  2003:12  (301  observations)  have 
been used. The French  price (swfr, EUROSTAT data) 
is  assumed  to  be  representative  of  the  EU  one.  US 
Gulf  FOB Hard Red  Wheat  prices and freight  rates 
(converted  in  euros  with  EUROSTAT  bilateral 
exchange  rates)  to  obtain  EU  CIF  prices  were  used 
(hrw, International Grains Council). The US price is 
assumed  to  represent  the  world  one.  Intervention 
prices and their monthly seasonal adjustments (pint) 
were  obtained  from  European  Commission 
regulations. All prices have been used in logs. 
First  of  all,  we  checked  whether  the  LOP  holds 
between swfr and hrw (pt′ = [swfrt  hrwt] in equation 
(1)). Results of unit root tests overall confirmed that 
the series are I(1)
iv. A cointegration analysis has been   3 
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performed
v. The cointegration rank turned out to be 
zero. 
To introduce policy regimes in the model, we create 
the “EU external reference price” (wref), a composite 
variable  calculated  as  the  maximum  between  the 
intervention  price  and  the  world  (US)  price.  As 
explained in the previous paragraph, the intervention 
price acts as a lower threshold for the US price (which 
tends  to  be  above  it  from  the  MacSharry  Reform 
onwards,  Figure  1).  wref  contains  162  times  the 
intervention price over 301 months and is I(1), as well. 
The rank of the cointegration matrix between swfr and 
wref is one. The estimates of Model 1 (equation (1), 
where  pt′  =  [swfrt    wreft])  are  reported  in  Table  1.  
Adjustment coefficients are both significant and have 
the  right  sign.    A  1  coefficient  for  transmission 
elasticity is not rejected (χ
2 =0.161; p-value 0.688).  
We  then  observe  a  co-movement  of  EU  and  US 
prices  under  certain  “policy  regime”  conditions.  To 
further explore the theoretical framework  which has 
been proposed, alternative models can be built. Model 
2 can be interpreted as a cointegration threshold model 
in which the adjustment coefficients take different but 
non-zero values according to the observable regime to 
which the observations belong. In fact, we assume that 
the LOP holds between the EU price and the US price 
only when the latter is above the intervention price; 
otherwise, the LOP will hold between the intervention 
and  the  French  price.  Price  reactions  to  long-run 
disequilibria are allowed to be different in either case. 
This  is  achieved  through  the  creation  of  a  regime 
dummy variable, regt. We then estimate the following 
model: 
t i t t ε  p α α  p + + - + = ∑
=
- - - - -
n
i
,t t ,t t )z reg ( z reg
1
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1        (4) 
where  z1,t-1= (swfrt-1 - hrwt-1), z2,t-1= (swfrt-1 - pintt-1). If 
hrwt1 > pintt-1, then regt-1 = 1, and only z1,t-1  is “active”; 
if  hrwt-1  <  pintt-1,  and  then  regt-1  =  0,  only  z2,t-1    is 
“active”. Estimates of Model 2 are reported in Table 1. 
In  the  French  equation,  the  adjustment  coefficients 
have the right sign, though only the one to the LOP 
holding  with  the  intervention  price  is  significant. 
Moreover, │α1│<│α2│, i.e. the French price responds 
more quickly to the LOP holding with the intervention 
than with the US price. In the US equation, α1 has the 
right sign but is not significant and α2 has not even the 
right  sign  (the  US  price  does  not  respond  to  the 
disequilibria from the LOP between the intervention 
and the French price).  
In Model 3, we assume that regime changes don’t 
affect the adjustment parameters, but the cointegration 
vector itself. The French price is still expected to be 
linked to either the intervention price or the US price 
according  to  which  of  them  is  higher;  but  the 











































































































Fig. 1  Soft wheat French price, US Hard Red Wheat price, intervention price (EUR/t) 
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Table 1: Model  estimates (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
 
     swfr   hrw  Cointegration relation 
Model 1  α0  -0.093***  0.064**  swfrt=- 0.397+1.054wreft 
α1  -0.013  0.022  Model 2 
α2  -0.099***  -0.025 
LOP imposed 
Model 3  α3  -0.073***  0.002  swfrt =1.400+ 0.707 wreft -0.022 regt wreft 
α4  -0.023  0.021 
Model 4 
α5  -0.260***  -0.069 
swfrt =1.400+ 0.707 wreft -0.022 regt wreft 
 
The cointegrating vector of the VECM between the 
US and the French price is assumed to be 
t t t t t z wref reg β wref β β swfr = - - - 2 1 0                                 (5)  
If hrwt > pintt, and then regt = 1, we have 
t t t z hrw swfr + + + = ) ( 2 1 0 b b b                                            (6)  
and if hrwt < pintt, regt = 0, the relation is 
t t t z pint swfr + + = 1 0 b b                                                   (7)  
As  expected,  the  elasticity  of  transmission  is  lower 
with the US than with the intervention price (Table 1), 
but the difference doesn’t seem of a big magnitude. 
Both adjustments coefficients (α3) have the right sign, 
but the US one is not significant;  this could depend on 
its weak exogeneity, but also on the fact that it does 
not react to the disequilibria between the French and 
the intervention price.  
Finally,  in  Model  4,  both  adjustment  coefficients 
and  the  cointegrating  relationship  were  allowed  to 
differ. We have  
t i t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t t ε  p z reg α z reg α  p + + - + = ∑
=
- - - - -
n
i 1
5 4 * ) 1 ( * * *   (8) 
where zt is calculated as in Model 3. If regt-1 = 1, the 
adjustment coefficient to the LOP holding with the US 
price are given by α4; if regt-1 = 0, then the adjustment 
coefficients to the LOP holding with the intervention 
price are given by α5. Adjustment coefficients of the 
US and the EU prices behave consistently with Model 
2, though slightly higher in absolute value (Table 1).  
Interestingly, for the French price, the adjustment 
coefficients of Model 1 and 3, in which the LOP holds 
between a combination of US and intervention prices, 
are in between those of Model 2 and 4, where they are 
allowed  to  vary  according  to  which  price  the  LOP 
holds with. This is valid also for Model 3 for the US 
price.  Significant  and  consistent  EU  adjustment 
coefficients suggest that the role of the US price might 
be understood only in light of adequate consideration 
for  policy  regimes.  US  coefficients  are  instead 
significant only in Model 1. To which extent the US 
price  is  weakly  exogenous  (Model  3)  or  the 
cointegrating relationship is driven by the intervention 
price (Models 2, 4) requires further research. 
IV. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS  
This paper aims at considering policy regimes while 
studying international price transmission. The focus is 
on  soft  wheat,  a  highly  traded  commodity  whose 
market has been heavily regulated by the CAP. French 
(EU) domestic prices and US (world) prices have been 
analyzed in the period 1978:12-2003:12.  
The analysis has been performed within the general 
framework of cointegration analysis to test the LOP. 
The models presented, though over-simplified, are an 
attempt of combining policy and price data. 
Firstly,  the  regime  switch  has  been  modelled 
through  the  creation  of  a  composite  variable,  the 
maximum between the US and the intervention price. 
This series is cointegrated with the French price. This 
means  that,  basically  after  the  MacSharry  Reform, 
which reduced the intervention price allowing the US 
one  to  be  much  more  often  above  it,  US  prices 
interacted more  with EU domestic ones, even if the 
same border policies kept being in place.  
This  relationship  has  been  further  investigated. A 
threshold model has been estimated (Model 2), with 
different  adjustments  coefficients  depending  on  the 
observable policy regime. The LOP has been imposed 
between  the  French and the  higher  between  the US 
and the intervention price. The French price responds 
more quickly to the LOP with the intervention price; 
the response of the US price brings some interpretative 
problems.  In  Model  3,  it  is  the  price  transmission 
elasticity which is allowed to change; the one between 
the French and the intervention price turns out to be 
stronger than the one with the US price. The US price 
performs as weakly exogenous. Finally, in Model 4,   5 
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both  adjustment  coefficients  and  the  cointegrating 
vector  parameters  are  allowed  to  vary.  Results  are 
consistent with the previous ones.  
Unfortunately,  more  recent  observations  were  not 
available for the French price. In the last months in 
particular,  soaring  food  prices  inflamed  the  debate 
(characterizing  the  last  CAP  reforms  already)  about 
the  appropriateness  of  domestic  support  and  border 
policies, and caused dramatic changes in commercial 
policy  measures.  Considering  the  evolving 
international context goes then beyond the use of more 
recent data, and represents an interesting possibility of 
developing the framework presented. 
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i For the EU, the entry price of the main cereals was capped at 155% of the intervention price, if the sum of the duties 
would make it go above this threshold.  
ii Instead, we expect the EU export prices and the world ones to be cointegrated, right because of EU export subsidies. 
iii After 1995, this is true also if the sum of the world price plus tariff doesn’t exceed the 155% of the intervention price. In 
practice, this has almost never been the case. 
iv Unit root tests and econometric estimates are available from the author upon request.  
v The optimum lag-length for the VAR has been chosen according to information criteria. Additional lags were included 
to remove autocorrelation. Monthly dummies were selected with specification tests. In Model 1, the Johansen and Juselius 
procedure has been followed (dummies were inserted outside the cointegration vector to account for export taxes).  